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THE VICE OF PRIDE
Robert C. Roberts
This paper clarifies the vice of pride by distinguishing it from emotions that 
are symptomatic of it and from virtuous dispositions that go by the same 
name, by identifying the disposition (humility) that is its virtue-counterpart, 
and by distinguishing its kinds. The analysis is aided by the conception of 
emotions as concern-based construals and the idea that pride can be a dispo-
sitional concern of a particular type or family of types.
When Benjamin Franklin was about twenty-four years old (in 1730), he 
“conceived the bold and arduous project of arriving at moral perfection.”1 
Finding, on initial efforts, that his undertaking was more than could be 
accomplished by mere resolution and good will, he devised a systematic 
discipline. He made a list of thirteen virtues (Temperance, Silence, Order, 
Resolution, Frugality, Industry, Sincerity, Justice, Moderation, Cleanliness, 
Tranquility, Chastity, and Humility) “and annexed to each a short precept 
which fully expressed the extent [he] gave to its meaning.”2 For example, 
the precept associated with Humility was “Imitate Jesus and Socrates.” 
He then concentrated on one virtue per week, and contrived a chart on 
which, in the evening of each day, he would mark failures with respect to 
the virtue of the week. He reckoned that, if he had a whole week clear of 
failure-marks for the assigned virtue, he could think he had made prog-
ress on it and was ready to go on to the next one. He went on to the next 
virtue in any case, and so gave himself a thirteen-week course. Thus he 
could repeat the course four times in a year. He comments that, though he 
never reached moral perfection by this means, he did experience improve-
ment, and expresses the hope that some of his descendents will also profit 
from his method.
My list of virtues contain’d at first but twelve; but a Quaker friend 
having kindly informed me that I was generally thought proud; that 
my pride show’d itself frequently in conversation; that I was not 
content with being in the right when discussing any point, but was 
overbearing, and rather insolent, of which he convinc’d me by men-
tioning several instances; I determined endeavouring to cure myself, 
if I could, of this vice or folly among the rest, and I added Humility 
1Benjamin Franklin, Autobiography, in Benjamin Franklin: The Autobiography and 
Other Writings, selected and ed. with an introduction by L. Jesse Lemisch (New 
York: New American Library, 1961), p. 94. 
2Ibid., p. 95.
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to my list, giving an extensive meaning to the word. I cannot boast 
of much success in acquiring the reality of this virtue, but I had a 
good deal with regard to the appearance of it. I made it a rule to 
forbear all direct contradiction to the sentiments of others, and all 
positive assertion of my own. I even forbid myself, agreeably to the 
old laws of our Junto, the use of every word or expression in the 
language that imported a fix’d opinion, such as certainly, undoubt-
edly, etc., and I adopted, instead of them, I conceive, I apprehend, 
or I imagine a thing to be so or so; or it so appears to me at present.3 
When another asserted something that I thought an error, I deny’d 
myself the pleasure of contradicting him abruptly, and of showing 
immediately some absurdity in his proposition; and in answering I 
began by observing that in certain cases or circumstances his opinion 
would be right, but in the present case there appear’d or seem’d to 
me some difference, etc. I soon found the advantage of this change in 
my manner; the conversations I engag’d in went on more pleasantly. 
The modest way in which I propos’d my opinions procur’d them 
a readier reception and less contradiction; I had less mortification 
when I was found to be in the wrong, and I more easily prevail’d 
with others to give up their mistakes and join with me when I hap-
pened to be in the right. And this mode, which I at first put on with 
some violence to natural inclination, became at length so easy, and 
so habitual to me, that perhaps for these fifty years past no one has 
ever heard a dogmatical expression escape me. And to this habit (af-
ter my character of integrity) I think it principally owing that I had 
early so much weight with my fellow-citizens when I proposed new 
institutions, or alterations in the old, and so much influence in public 
councils when I became a member; for I was but a bad speaker, never 
eloquent, subject to much hesitation in my choice of words, hardly 
correct in language, and yet I generally carried my points. In reality, 
there is, perhaps, no one of our natural passions so hard to subdue 
as pride. Disguise it, struggle with it, beat it down, stifle it, mortify it 
as much as one pleases, it is still alive, and will every now and then 
peep out and show itself; you will see it, perhaps, often in this his-
tory; for, even if I could conceive that I had compleatly overcome it, 
I should probably be proud of my humility.4
Pride and Pride
Franklin was an admirable sinner. The friendly Quaker confessor alerted 
him to his pride, and with commendable willingness to hear hard words 
about his character, and typical Franklinian enterprise, Ben added this 
failing to his program of self-reform. But what is pride? I mean, What sort 
of thing is it?
3Franklin gives what appears to be a different account of the genesis of this 
policy on p. 31, where he seems to be reporting developments that occurred in 
1722, when he was about sixteen. See ibid., pp. 30–32. 
4Ibid., pp. 103–105. 
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Franklin takes it to be a “vice or folly,” and thinks that he’d be rid of it 
if he could just become humble. But pride is often taken to be an emotion, 
something you feel on a given occasion, say, when your child achieves 
something wonderful and conspicuous, or your country takes several 
gold medals at the Olympics. This, evidently, is not the kind of pride that 
Franklin wants to dispel from his character, though he does mention that, 
as part of the discipline of overcoming his pride, he would deny himself 
“the pleasure of contradicting [his interlocutor] abruptly, and of showing 
immediately some absurdity in his proposition.” The pleasure he denies 
himself here does seem to be an emotion, and maybe it could be called 
pride; perhaps the pleasure of a swift and summary refutation was his 
feeling of pride in besting a dialectical rival, and in thus hammering home 
his intellectual superiority. But even if so, such pleasure is not exactly what 
Franklin wants to overcome. Instead, his denying himself this pleasure is 
instrumental to overcoming the disposition from which it arises. He hopes 
that quelling the product of his vicious disposition will diminish the dis-
position by retroaction.
So the pride that he is primarily concerned to extirpate is a disposi-
tion or bad “habit,” and not an emotion, though it has emotional expres-
sions or consequences, and some of these expressions may also go by the 
name of pride. A viciously proud person does sometimes feel pride in a 
vicious way. But the emotional expressions of pride as a vice are not all 
pleasant feelings of pride the emotion. Franklin also mentions the hedonic 
downside of the vice. One’s pride in this sense can be “wounded,” and the 
wounds can be very unpleasant. In fact, one of the advantages of training 
himself in a more humble demeanor was that he “had less mortification 
when [he] was found to be in the wrong.”
Behind both the pleasure and the pain of the pride that Franklin wants 
to extirpate is a concern, an ongoing dispositional desire, a goal, that is 
misconceived. He tells us that it comes out in his conversation. He wasn’t 
“content with being in the right when discussing any point, but was over-
bearing, and rather insolent.” So what he wanted wasn’t just truth, nor 
even, more egoistically, being right. He wanted to triumph over the inter-
locutor, metaphorically to have his knee on his interlocutor’s neck. He 
wanted to look down on the defeated asserter and see eyes submissively 
pleading for mercy—Ben’s mercy. He wanted to be the dialectical big man 
in town and everybody to know it. Thus the pleasure of abrupt contradic-
tion and the showing of absurdity in the other’s thought; and the pain, on 
occasion, when the interlocutor was on top looking down, and everybody 
there to see it. So what Franklin seems to have wanted, under the title 
of pride, is domination, and of course the complement of domination is 
submission. To dominate another is to get submission from him—if in no 
other way, then in the silent acknowledgment of Franklin’s superiority.
The device that Franklin used in his pride for beating the competitor 
emotionally into submission was “language that imported a fix’d opin-
ion,” words like ‘certainly,’ ‘undoubtedly,’ ‘any intelligent person would 
see that . . . ,’ ‘one would have to be com pletely stupid to think that . . . ,’ 
and the like. As Franklin notes, this device is decidedly ill chosen. Pride in 
this sense is clearly “folly.” You can bet on it that your discussion partner 
also has a bit of pride, and will take ill to being beaten up in this way. 
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Even if your argument is watertight and he sees that it is so, he is likely to 
resist out of sheer perversity if you treat him disrespectfully. So Franklin’s 
personal style, prior to his humility program, was pretty barbarous, and 
not very well calculated to achieve the submission of his interlocutors. 
And his method of self-discipline in “humility” was the rather simple one 
of changing the language he used in debate. He found that a less overtly 
domineering demeanor, more respectful linguistic behavior toward his 
interlocutor, yielded an increase in his power over the other’s opinions.
Franklin reports that the humility discipline that he imposed on himself 
required “some violence to natural inclination,” but eventually became 
easy and habitual, so that he had virtually complete success in rooting out 
“dogmatical expression” from his speech. But he also distinguishes the 
appearance of humility from “the reality of this virtue,” admitting that his 
success was more with the appearance, and ends the passage by saying 
that perhaps “no one of our natural passions [is] so hard to subdue as 
pride. Disguise it, struggle with it, beat it down, stifle it, mortify it as much 
as one pleases, it is still alive, and will every now and then peep out and 
show itself.”
So pride is more than pleasure in the oppressive use of dogmatical ex-
pressions, and humility more than modesty of assertion. In this last, rather 
despairing comment about the ineradicability of pride, Franklin echoes 
Christianity and sounds a bit quaint to modern ears. To our contempo-
raries, ‘pride’ is more likely to name a virtue than a vice. If we are to affirm 
the ancient teaching that seems to inform Franklin’s thought despite its 
utilitarian tone, we must sort good pride from the vice.
Virtue or Vice?
When a child is proud of her father’s skill or a father of his kids’ accom-
plishments, pride can be healthy and admirable. A child who is ashamed 
of her father or indifferent to her father’s accomplishments seems, for that 
at least, less well. These cases of pride seem to be a proper bonding, corol-
laries of love. The father’s heart is bonded to the child by the awareness 
that his daughter is proud of him, and the child’s heart is bonded to her 
father by the knowledge that her dad is proud of her. Those who think 
all pride vicious may think the right emotion not pride but admiration, 
because pride has ego in it that admiration lacks. But just because admira-
tion lacks reference to self, admiration of her father would not do the same 
job of bonding.
The self-reference in pride can also lend health to a deflated self. 
The poor black teenager who is proud of the accomplishments of Louis 
Armstrong or Michael Jordan or Toni Morrison enjoys a mitigation of 
an erosive discouragement, a prop in the edifice of his dignity and self-
respect. Self-confidence, self-esteem, self-respect are dispositional atti-
tudes in the neighborhood of pride but are not vicious. Patriotism is a 
kind of pride, and may be a virtue. ‘Pride’ is an ambiguous term, and as 
far as I can tell, always has been.
Despite the centrality of pride in the Christian tradition’s discussion of 
sin, the New Testament has no fixed term for it, and does not seem to give 
the idea a central place. In Romans 11.20 Paul says, “do not become proud 
THE VICE OF PRIDE 123
(uJyhla; fronei§n), but stand in awe.” In 12.16 he says, “do not be haughty 
(uJyhla; fronou§nteß), but associate with the lowly; never be conceited 
(frovnimoi par’eJautoi§ß).” “Love . . . is not boastful (perpereuvomai), it is not 
proud (fusiou§tai)” (I Corinthians 13.4); “Knowledge puffs up (fusioi§), 
love builds up” (I Corinthians 8.1); and in II Corinthians Paul struggles 
with his inclination to boast (kaucavomai). I Timothy 6.17 says, “as for the 
rich in this world, charge them not to be haughty (uJyhlofronei§n).” Paul 
prefaces his discussion of humility in Philippians 2 by saying “do nothing 
from selfishness (ejriqeiva) or conceit (kenodoxiva).” The thinness of the New 
Testament’s conceptualization of the vice(s) of pride, along with the fact 
that the English ‘pride’ also names some good emotion types or disposi-
tions, suggests that it is useful, in analyzing ‘pride,’ to find the more evalu-
atively specific terms for which it substitutes. For example, ‘arrogance,’ 
‘snobbishness,’ and ‘domination’ for vicious pride and ‘self-respect,’ ‘self-
confidence,’ and ‘dignity’ for virtuous pride.
Pride turns out to be several vices, and individuals may be more af-
flicted with one than with another. Franklin’s main problem, in the pas-
sage quoted, seems to have been with domination, the desire to subject 
others to oneself, to receive submission from them, for the sake of feeling 
big and powerful in comparison. Perhaps when Franklin comments about 
the difficulty of eradicating pride, he has in mind that while his program 
of virtue-acquisition has made him more genteel in the ways he dominates 
others, he is still concerned to dominate them. Getting the other to ac-
knowledge defeat in debate is one way of getting submission from him 
or her. Another is to have had a significant influence in the formation of 
the other’s mind and life. We may see this too in Franklin’s autobiogra-
phy, which is punctuated by accounts of the various institutions that he 
invented or initiated, and the influence these have had on the American 
people. But it is sometimes very hard to distinguish a questionable pride-
ful joy of being the author of another’s mind from a generous joy in the 
other’s flourishing. Most people’s generosity, I would judge, is tainted 
with a bit of the vicious motive.
Of course, it is often important for one person to dominate another. Par-
ents need to dominate their children, and organizations require chains of 
command, and the wise may need to dominate the foolish for the latter’s 
(and everyone’s) good. The kind of pride that such benign domination 
requires might be called ‘authority’ or ‘leadership.’ These are instrumental 
dominations, and one avoids the vice of domination as long as the sub-
ject’s structure of desire reflects this instrumentality. Nelson Mandela and 
George Washington exercised their domination through political office. 
That they did so not predominantly out of a desire for power but out of a 
desire for the public good is suggested by the fact that they relinquished 
their power at the appointed time. Compare these men with the countless 
others who have been unwilling to resign power, once in office, and have 
sought to become “presidents for life,” and the like.
In addition to domination, arrogance, vanity, and conceit, other vices 
belonging to the pride family are egotism, hyper-autonomy, grandiosity, 
pretentiousness, snobbery, impertinence or presumption, haughtiness, 
self-righteousness, selfish ambition, and self-complacency. Each of these 
can be analyzed for its vicious elements, but all have something or other to 
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do with the inordinate prominence of the self in an individual’s thinking, 
caring, and action.5 ‘Inordinate’ may suggest “too much,” but in discus-
sions of vice, more usually it needs to mean something like “wrong kind.” 
A great deal of prominence of the self is compatible with humility, if the 
prominence is of the right kind. And all these vices seem to be, in their 
own ways, opposite to humility. One thing we are saying when we iden-
tify non-vicious kinds of pride like the ones I mentioned at the beginning 
of this section is that they don’t fall in any of the above vice categories, and 
that they are compatible with humility.
In Walker Percy’s The Moviegoer, the narrator’s aunt Emily has a serious 
talk with him concerning his irresponsibility and moral laxity. She appeals 
to his pride, in the sense of self-respect. The conversation raises questions 
about self-respect and humility, since she is commending to him a kind 
of self-respect that involves regarding oneself as better than other people. 
The case is analytically interesting because such comparison rides danger-
ously close to the edge of vicious pride:
I’ll make you a little confession. I am not ashamed to use the word 
class. I will also plead guilty to another charge. The charge is that 
people belonging to my class think they’re better than other people. 
You’re damn right we’re better. We’re better because we do not shirk 
our obligations either to ourselves or to others. We do not whine. We 
do not organize a minority group and blackmail the government. We 
do not prize mediocrity for mediocrity’s sake.6
If Aunt Emily is not viciously proud, how is this to be explained? She has 
a relatively high opinion of herself, but does not seem to be arrogant, if 
we take arrogance to be a disposition to infer some illicit entitlement from 
a supposition of one’s superiority,7 nor conceited, if we take conceit to be 
the set of dispositions of thought, action, and emotion that stem from an 
unwarrantedly high opinion of oneself. She may well be right about her 
superiority, and she’s not inferring any illicit entitlement from it.
She might seem snobbish, since she frankly admits that she considers 
herself to be better than certain people in an important respect, and looks 
down on them therefore with a certain contempt. If we try to think of a 
way of being snobbish without being vicious, we might define snobbish-
ness simply as thinking oneself better than other people in some impor-
tant respect. But this is not what ‘snobbish’ usually means. Snobbery is 
an attitude of illegitimate contempt toward other people, and involves be-
having toward them in illegitimately exclusive ways. Thus the judgment 
that so-and-so does not play the cello up to the standards of the Chicago 
Symphony Orchestra, and so we should exclude him from the orchestra, 
does not amount to snobbishness. If he’s been trying to foist himself on 
5Quick analyses of several of the above vices are given in Robert C. Roberts 
and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2007), pp. 236–237, and we give more extensive analysis of van-
ity, arrogance, and domination in the chapter on humility, pp. 236–256. 
6Walker Percy, The Moviegoer (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 195.
7See ibid., p. 243.
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the orchestra despite his klutzy cello playing, the selection committee may 
even feel some legitimate contempt for him. But it would be snobbish to ex-
clude him because he is a social bumpkin and speaks English with a back-
woods accent. Other forms of illegitimate exclusivity are like snobbishness 
but have specific names such as racism, sexism, and xenophobia; these too 
might be regarded as vicious forms of pride. By these standards for snob-
bishness, nothing in the quotation indicates that Aunt Emily is snobbish.
We are not told how Aunt Emily would explain her superiority to those 
she criticizes. If she explains that she, by the grace of providence, had 
the benefit of a proper upbringing of which the yahoos may have been 
deprived, she would escape also the accusation of self-righteousness. On 
the other hand, she would fall under this condemnation if she insisted that 
her uprightness is her own doing and the yahoos are as culpable of their 
degeneracy as she is praiseworthy for her righteousness.
She might be humble even in her politically incorrect statement, if she 
does not take a certain kind of pleasure in being better than the people she 
compares herself with—if, for example, she would welcome everybody’s 
being like her. A kind of pleasure in superiority that is contrary to humility 
is what we might call “invidious” pleasure, a pleasure that focuses not on 
the substance of her superiority (which she sketches in the above quota-
tion), but on the superiority as superiority. She does take some kind of plea-
sure in not being like those others, but that pleasure may not be of a kind 
to vitiate her humility. For example, she is not glad that her nephew is irre-
sponsible and morally lax, and thus is not glad that he comes off so badly 
in comparison with her. She is glad not to be like him, but not glad that 
he is not like her. If her attitude towards her nephew is duplicated in her 
attitude toward everybody, then her judgment of her superiority indicates 
no vicious pride. We could say that she is proud, all right, but not viciously 
so. She does not take joy in the fact that there are people inferior to herself 
in the detailed respects, but finds this transparently regrettable. We might 
call her pride dignity, rather than self-righteousness or snobbery.
What if the Pharisee had said not “God, I thank thee that I am not like 
other men, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even like this tax collector” 
(Luke 18.11), but instead, “God, I pray thee that the extortioners, unjust, 
adulterers, and this tax collector may become like me”? Jesus’ moral assess-
ments of some Pharisees suggest that this way of putting the matter would 
also be a symptom of self-righteousness, even if it does not express con-
tempt for the tax collector as the original formula does. Self-righteousness 
is a kind of vicious pride, but it depends on a factual premise: that the sub-
ject is in fact not righteous. Jesus himself no doubt wished that the sinners 
should be more like himself; but in him, this does not amount to self-righ-
teousness. Aunt Emily might be right in all her claims to moral superiority 
and would not become “Pharisaic” unless she were wrong about some-
thing in her moral claims—say, that she was more in God’s favor than the 
deadbeats, on account of her being such a responsible citizen.
I have argued for years that, for purposes of moral psychology, it is 
helpful to think of emotions as concern-based construals,8 and I think this 
8For example, in Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003). I apply the account to several Christian virtues 
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construction can help us distinguish vicious from virtuous pride. A con-
cern-based construal is a kind of concerned perceptual grasp of a situation 
in which the elements of the situation are organized according to some 
paradigm. The elements in the pride paradigm are something worthy of 
praise and its being mine. Thus the child who is proud of her father’s skill 
construes the skill as worthy of praise, and construes the man who possesses 
this skill as my father. Both of these elements need to be in the picture for 
the emotion to be an instance of pride. If the child does not construe her 
father’s skill as worthy of praise, she will not be proud of it; and if she does 
not construe the man as in some sense belonging to her, she may admire 
or envy the skill, but she will not be proud of it. Of course she need not 
construe the man specifically as her father. She might construe him as her 
friend, her brother, her countryman, or her teacher; but she must somehow 
positively associate the worthy thing with herself. Pride has a necessary 
self-reference, and this is the element that most famously qualifies it as 
potentially vicious.
I have also pointed out that these perceptual “takes” on situations are 
concern-based. The subject cares about the elements in the situation, and 
this caring is integrated into the perception. In the current example, the 
child cares about her father’s skill, thus seeing it as a good thing; and she 
also cares about her father’s connection to herself, thus seeing the worthi-
ness of her father’s skill as enhancing her own worth, reflecting well on 
herself. In the most virtuous form of this child’s pride, the child’s bond 
to her father—the psychological explanation of how the father belongs to 
her—is her love for him, which is the entanglement of her father’s inter-
ests with her own. Thus the “self” that is enhanced by the father’s skill is, 
for the child, not just the child’s, but the father’s as well.
Compare this mine with the egoistic mine of Franklin’s early pleasure in 
barbarous dialectical domination of his fellows. Here we have variation in 
the character of the mine. He feels proud after slam-dunking an interlocu-
tor because he sees dialectical triumph / defeat of a competitor / the subjec-
tion of the interlocutor as worthy of praise; and it is attributable to himself: 
I, Ben, did it. Although the mine element figures in both of these examples 
of the emotion of pride, it differs considerably in character. In the child 
case its selfishness is muted by the child’s identification with her father, 
and that identification itself is virtuous. The child’s pride is an expression 
of filial excellence. In the Franklin case, the egoism in the mine is rampant 
and socially destructive.
The mine can also be differentially stressed. In one pride construal the 
stress can fall more on the fact that the worthy thing is mine, and in an-
other on the fact that it is worthy. In the latter kind of case pride shades 
into admiration, and we probably tend to think of the cases in which 
the stress is less on the mine and more on the worthy as having less vice 
potential. Because pride as an emotion is a construal, the mine element 
can vary, from one instance of the emotion type to another, in emphasis 
and character, thus yielding instances that fall on different sides of the 
virtue / vice divide.
in Spiritual Emotions: Reflections on Christian Virtues (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 2007). 
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Pride can also vary evaluatively with variation in the worthy element. 
The child’s pride might be vicious, despite expressing love, in case what the 
child construes as worthy in the father is unworthy. For example, if the child 
were proud of her father’s prowess at humiliating interlocutors, it would be 
a vicious emotion even though it helps to bond her with her father. I sup-
pose we could say that it is vicious in one respect and virtuous in another.
“Imitate Jesus”
Franklin affixes to his virtue of humility a precept that “fully expresses” the 
extent of its meaning: “Imitate Jesus and Socrates.” The humility of Socrates 
is an interesting subject that I will not explore here. But I do think the humil-
ity of Jesus, and more broadly the concept of humility that seems to operate 
in the New Testament, will throw some light on the nature of pride as a vice. 
One important way to analyze a vice is to identify carefully its virtue coun-
terpart. Various accounts of humility have been offered within and without 
the Christian tradition, and I will offer one that I think is the dominant New 
Testament concept, which I think will make sense of, or correct, the various 
other accounts. Some have thought humility to be a disposition to low self-
assessment, low self-esteem.9 From Hume, for example, one gets the im-
pression, if not the idea, that humility is a kind of shame or self-contempt.10 
One recent writer has made modesty (which is perhaps similar to humil-
ity) a dogmatic self-underestimation.11 One sees this tendency also in some 
Christian writers, some popular medieval spirituality handbooks12 and also 
in Jonathan Edwards,13 where humility may blend into penitence. Aquinas 
thinks of humility as a disposition of restraint of inordinate ambition, a 
check on the desire to be something above what you are. More recent secu-
lar writers tend to see humility as moderate or accurate self-assessment—a 
self-evaluation that neither over- nor underestimates one’s worth.14
9See Walter MacDougall, Character and the Conduct of Life (London: Methuen 
Publishers, 1927), p. 129. 
10See A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. Selby Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1888), Book II, Part 1. “by pride I understand that agreeable impression, 
which arises in the mind, when the view either of our virtue, beauty, riches or 
power makes us satisfy’d with ourselves: And . . . by humility I mean the opposite 
impression” (p. 297). “According as our idea is more or less advantageous, we feel 
either of those opposite affections, and are elated by pride, or dejected by humil-
ity” (p. 277). “every cause of pride, by its peculiar qualities, produces a separate 
pleasure, and of humility a separate uneasiness” (p. 285). “Thus pride is a pleasant 
sensation, and humility a painful” (p. 286). 
11Julia Driver, “The Virtues of Ignorance,” Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989), pp. 
373–384. 
12See Walter Hilton, The Stairway of Perfection, trans. M. L. Del Mastro (Garden 
City: Doubleday, 1979), p. 81. 
13“Love to God, as it exalts him, tends to low thoughts and estimates of our-
selves, and leads to a deep sense of unworthiness and our desert of ill” (Charity and 
Its Fruits [Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1978], p. 79).
14“[H]umility consists, roughly, in having oneself and one’s accomplishments in 
perspective” (Norvin Richards, Humility [Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 
1992], p. 188). See also Nancy Snow, “Humility,” in Personal Virtues, ed. Clifford 
128 Faith and Philosophy
In the New Testament, Jesus of Nazareth is the paradigm exemplar of 
humility, and the model held up for imitation by his followers. In the sec-
ond chapter of his letter to the Philippians, Paul says
Do nothing out of selfish ambition (kata; ejriqeivan) or vain conceit 
(kata; kenodoxivan), but in humility (th§/ tapeinofrosuvnh/) consider 
others better than yourselves. Each of you should look not only to 
your own interests, but also to the interests of others. Your attitude 
should be the same as that of Christ Jesus: Who, being in very nature 
God, did not consider equality with God something to be grasped, 
but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of a servant, being 
made in human likeness. And being found in appearance as a man, 
he humbled himself (ejtapeivnwsen eJautovn) and became obedient to 
death—even death on a cross! (vv.3–8)
Since Paul also holds Christ to be without sin, Paul must distinguish 
strictly between humility and penitence. The identification of humility 
with low self-esteem is also out, since knowing oneself to be in the form of 
God is not compatible with a low estimate of one’s personal value. Indeed, 
in another paradigm New Testament passage for Christ’s being the model 
of humility, he explicitly claims to be the Lord and Master of those who 
are to imitate him. The passage is from the 13th chapter of John’s Gospel:
When he had finished washing [the disciples’] feet, he put on his 
clothes and returned to his place. “Do you understand what I have 
done for you?” he asked them. “You call me ‘Teacher’ and ‘Lord,’ and 
rightly so, for that is what I am. Now that I, your Lord and Teacher, 
have washed your feet, you also should wash one another’s feet. I 
have set you an example that you should do as I have done for you. I 
tell you the truth, no servant is greater than his master, nor is a mes-
senger greater than the one who sent him. Now that you know these 
things, you will be blessed if you do them.” (vv.12–17)
This passage is a narrative illustration of Paul’s point. Without being ig-
norant of his exalted status, Jesus does not “insist” on it. He is willing to 
ignore it for the sake of ministering to his disciples. His lack of personal 
concern about his status vis-à-vis others stands in stark contrast with 
the hyper-concern and hyper-awareness of status that prevails among 
his disciples.15
Williams (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 73–89, where she makes out hu-
mility to be a proper sense of one’s limitations where ‘sense’ implies an emotional 
acceptance of such—either as an individual in comparison with other individuals 
(“narrow humility”) or as a human being in relation to the universe (“existential 
humility”).
15I have suggested that ‘dignity’ and ‘self-respect’ identify kinds of virtuous 
pride. While Jesus is willing to “ignore” his personal importance for the sake of his 
ministry, he nevertheless exhibits an understated dignity in his demeanor worthy 
of the Son of God. Even while washing the disciples’ feet or dying on the cross, he 
acts with an underlying authority and dignity that might be called pride. 
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Then the mother of the sons of Zebedee came up to him, with her 
sons, and kneeling before him she asked him for something. And 
he said to her, “What do you want?” She said to him, “Command 
that these two sons of mine may sit, one at your right hand and one 
at your left, in your kingdom.” But Jesus answered, “You do not 
know what you are asking. Are you able to drink the cup that I am 
to drink?” They said to him, “We are able.” He said to them, “You 
will drink my cup, but to sit at my right hand and at my left is not 
mine to grant, but it is for those for whom it has been prepared by 
my Father.” And when the ten heard it, they were indignant at the 
two brothers. But Jesus called them to him and said, “You know that 
the rulers of the Gentiles lord it over them, and their great men ex-
ercise authority over them. It shall not be so among you; but who-
ever would be great among you must be your servant, and whoever 
would be first among you must be your slave; even as the Son of man 
came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for 
many.” (Matthew 20.20–28)
I have suggested, in my few remarks on these passages, that the concept 
of humility here is the concept of a trait marked by the absence of a cer-
tain kind of concern or of concerned attention. The humble person is one who 
easily, even automatically, puts his personal importance or social status 
out of mind for the sake of some important project or goal or other con-
cern. He may be perfectly well informed and accurate in his judgment 
of his status / importance (high or low), but the essential thing is that his 
status / importance does not preoccupy him. The apostle Paul, for a con-
trasting example, struggles for humility without always succeeding. He 
sometimes finds himself letting his personal concern for his status among 
the apostles, his leadership in the churches, get entangled (confused) with 
the work to which he has been called. He struggles with “boasting” and 
gives lists of his qualifications, accomplishments, and sufferings. This 
point is not unambiguously clear, because others’ recognition of Paul’s sta-
tus as an apostle may be crucial to his work as an apostle, and this kind of 
concern for his status / importance is compatible with humility. But I think 
it is natural to read the passages about boasting as expressing a struggle 
with himself about a non-instrumental concern for his importance that 
Paul regards as a personal spiritual problem.
We don’t have a lot of material on the inner life of John the Baptist, but 
he appears in one passage as an excellent exemplar of humility, in the 
sense that I think is at work in the passages I have quoted.
Now a discussion arose between John’s disciples and a Jew over pu-
rifying. And they came to John, and said to him, “Rabbi, he who 
was with you beyond the Jordan [Jesus], to whom you bore witness, 
here he is, baptizing, and all are going to him.” John answered, “No 
one can receive anything except what is given him from heaven. You 
yourselves bear me witness, that I said, I am not the Christ, but I 
have been sent before him. He who has the bride is the bridegroom; 
the friend of the bridegroom, who stands and hears him, rejoices 
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greatly at the bridegroom’s voice; therefore this joy of mine is now 
full. He must increase, but I must decrease.” (John 3.25–30)
John has been a center of intense admiring and anxious attention by the 
people. He is revered as a prophet, and has disciples of his own. Now as 
Jesus comes on the scene, ready to begin his public ministry, we might 
expect John to be at least ambivalent, if not outright envious, as Jesus 
eclipses him. But such is his love for Jesus and for the kingdom that Jesus 
is bringing in, that John is not just willing, in a grudging way, to give up 
the limelight, but rejoices with a joy that is “complete.” In a discourse 
on this passage16 Søren Kierkegaard stresses John’s “humble self-denial,” 
seeming to make the object of John’s joy his own self-abnegation. This 
would suggest that, like Paul, John struggled against pride, but perhaps 
unlike Paul, succeeded and took pleasure in denying himself for Jesus’ 
sake. But this does not seem to me the natural reading of the passage. We 
have no evidence that John denies himself the pleasure of prominence, 
much less that his joy is about denying himself. Instead, it looks to me as 
though John rejoices simply in the advent of the kingdom that he has been 
heralding, and is unconcerned about his own fading into the background. 
What is extraordinary about him, in regard to humility and pride, is that 
his importance and prominence, which now “must decrease,” is not an 
issue for him.
How does the non-insistence analysis of humility relate to the various 
other accounts that we have mentioned? I have already commented that 
Jesus cannot be an exemplar of humility if we think of humility as low 
self-esteem, but the equanimity that the humble person exhibits about sta-
tus and prominence, which would also entail low anxiety about certain 
kinds of low self-evaluations, would suggest that the humble person is 
freer to make low self-estimates, when such are called for, than the proud 
person. Proud people are anxious about their importance, and such anxi-
ety can easily lead to distortions of judgment. Pride can make one defen-
sive against proper shame, and humility may accordingly be positively 
associated with shame in being a kind of openness to proper shame. But 
pride itself can also generate shame; caring about status and importance 
in the way the proud person does makes one vulnerable to slights, belittle-
ments, and humblings to which the humble person is emotionally less 
pervious. Remember Franklin’s reference to his “mortifications when [he] 
was found to be in the wrong.” Those who make humility a matter of ac-
curate self-assessment may thus be credited with having identified one 
of the important consequences of humility. As to the contemporary writers 
who see humility as moderate self-assessment, the non-insistence view 
of humility would deny that humility is any particular self-assessment; 
humility is, on the contrary, compatible with both very high (e.g., Christ) 
and very low self-assessment.
Aquinas’s account differs from the above views, making humility a 
“restraining” factor. He says that, “with regard to the difficult good” we 
need a virtue “to restrain and temper the mind, lest it tend to high things 
16Søren Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. and trans. Howard V. 
Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 275–291.
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immoderately; and this belongs to the virtue of humility” (ST 2a2æ, Q161, 
art.1, responsio). “Humility restrains the appetite from aiming at great 
things against right reason” (ST 2a2æ, Q161, art.1, reply 3). “it belongs 
properly to humility, that a man restrain himself from being borne to-
wards that which is above him” (ST 2a2æ, Q161, art.2, responsio).17 If we 
think of Jesus as having some factor in his personality that is “restrain-
ing” him from insisting on his divine status, we would still not have quite 
what Aquinas envisions here, since presumably Jesus would not be guilty 
of any immoderation or violation of right reason if he did insist on it. 
But there is perhaps a restraining factor in Jesus’ case nevertheless, for 
it seems reasonable to suppose that he “empties himself” out of love for 
humankind and in particular the project of redeeming us. His not insisting 
on his divine status is part of the salvation-strategy. But this restraining 
factor would not seem to be humility, but rather the different virtue of 
charity. My reading of the John the Baptist case is that John’s love of the 
kingdom dispels any concern he might otherwise have about being over-
shadowed by the greater Jesus. There is perhaps also some ambiguity in 
Question 161, evident in the above quotations, as to whether the humble 
agent actively restrains the urge to overreach, or whether the restraint is 
accomplished by humility without need for the agent’s active interven-
tion. Paul struggles to suppress his pride, but John seems not to exercise 
any restraint. This is why John seems to be more humble than Paul, a bet-
ter imitator of Jesus. Of course, John enjoys the advantage of our knowing 
far less about his inner life than we know of Paul’s.
So What Is Pride?
Franklin thinks that the cure for pride is well pursued by imitating Jesus, 
and in this he voices a very biblical and Pauline principle. But oddly 
enough, the particular behavioral advice that he gives under this head is 
not reminiscent of Jesus. Jesus does not avoid “language that import[s] 
a fix’d opinion,” nor does he ever, to my knowledge, preface his asser-
tions with “I conceive, I apprehend, or I imagine a thing to be so or so,” 
or any like expression of self-effacing tentativeness. He is not humble in 
that sense. He is not polite. He is much more likely to say “Verily, I say to 
you, . . .” or tell you you’re a hypocrite or a whitewashed tomb. Frank-
lin’s reformed way of speaking is more reminiscent of Socrates than of 
Jesus, who was positive, direct, and often even abrasive. Socrates did get 
himself in hot water by wounding people’s pride, but as far as I know he 
never got overtly harsh in the way Jesus sometimes was. If Jesus’ char-
acter is to be measured by his speech, he might well be thought to suffer 
from the vice of pride.
But Franklin too does not think that pride consists simply in haughty 
abruptness of speech. Despite his near-perfect success in making his lan-
guage more politic, he professes despair about overcoming his pride. “In 
reality, there is, perhaps, no one of our natural passions so hard to subdue 
as pride. Disguise it, struggle with it, beat it down, stifle it, mortify it as 
17The translation is by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (West-
minster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1981).
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much as one pleases, it is still alive.” Franklin is not a traditional Christian, 
but in this cri de coeur he sounds a characteristic note from the Christian 
tradition. I have tried in this paper to help him out in clarifying the con-
cept of pride as a vice, and I have proposed and briefly exemplified three 
devices to that end.
One device is to look at the structure of pride as an emotion type for 
clues about how instances of the type might be virtuous or vicious. Here 
we found two elements in pride as a concern-based construal—the worthy 
and the mine—and saw briefly how each of these elements, through the 
conception of it and the concern about it that took the shape of that con-
ception, might lend vice or virtue to instances of the type. This provided a 
way of explaining why the child’s pride in her father’s skill might be virtu-
ous while Franklin’s pride in his dialectical performances was vicious.
A second device is to try to get a bit clearer on the nature of the virtue 
of which pride is the vice-counterpart, and I have proposed that the New 
Testament concept of humility is that of a special kind of obliviousness, a 
kind of systematic inattention and non-caring. I have called it humility as 
non-insistence—in particular, non-insistence, non-caring, non-emphasis, 
inattention, about issues of one’s own importance, one’s own social status, 
one’s own greatness, particularly as the concern for and attention to these 
may be pushed aside or dimmed by some overriding concern or project, 
such as the salvation of the human race or the kingdom of God. (But the 
project supporting humility might be smaller, or a smaller part of the last, 
such as rearing some healthy children or improving the minds and hearts 
of one’s students.) The yield of this second device would seem to be that 
pride is a hyper-concern for status, for social importance, for greatness 
and honor, and a hyper-attention to these things. But it is a special sort 
of hyper-concern for them. It is just conceivable that someone might be 
very concerned for his social status in a purely instrumental way, and thus 
humble despite being extremely concerned with his own importance. He 
might think, for example, that it is important for him to be thought im-
portant, because his being honored is crucial to the accomplishment of 
the good (the kingdom of God, the education of the youth, the promotion 
of justice). Usually such a rationale for concerning oneself with status is a 
rationalization of the deeper desire simply to be honored for being great. 
It is a fig leaf for pride.
A third device I have offered for clarifying pride as a vice is to divide it 
into its distinct subspecies: domination, arrogance, vanity, conceit, egotism, 
hyper-autonomy, grandiosity, pretentiousness, snobbery, impertinence or 
presumption, haughtiness, self-righteousness, selfish ambition, self-com-
placency, and who knows what else. I brought this device to bear as a way 
of unconfusing innocuous or good pride, such as dignity, self-respect, and 
authority, from pride the vice(s). If the result of the second device is sound, 
then it will have uncovered a theme that runs through the list of the sub-
vices of pride. These will all be vices because they all involve, in one way or 
another, a hyper-concern for one’s own greatness, importance, and honor 
(and pride that is not a vice will lack this feature). But if they are really all 
distinct sub-vices, then identifying the theme will be only the beginning of 
the philosophical-ethical analysis of the vice of pride. (This paper has done 
very little in that direction.) One can see that there are quite a few ways 
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of being pridefully vicious, various colorations of seeing oneself and the 
social world through the lens of hyper-concern for the size of self, multiple 
permutations of prideful behavior-patterns, and diverse patterns of pos-
sible social havoc and ungodliness. If this third device is well conceived, a 
proper clarification of the vice of pride would be more the work of a book 
than of an essay. In the book one would find analyses and illustrations of 
the many varieties of pride and explorations of the ways they interact and 
support one another; and all of this would be set constantly in contrast 
with the virtue of humility as various kinds of absence: absence of the con-
cerned attention, and absence of the characteristic ways of thinking and 
action that form and flow from such concerned attention.
Pride was something of an afterthought in Ben Franklin’s campaign 
against the vice and folly in his life. In fact, it had to be brought to his at-
tention by his kindly Friend. But once the idea of attacking it occurred to 
him, he ran with it, in his own utilitarian, deistic, self-reliant sort of way. 
His discussion of it occupies more space in his autobiography than any of 
the other vices. He seems pretty proud that he rid himself so thoroughly 
of dogmatical expressions, but the dismay at his defeat by pride itself sug-
gests an inkling of deeper, more traditional Christian thought, something 
like a recognition of the bondage to sin—a paradoxical insight that fits 
better with the precept “imitate Jesus.”18
Baylor University
18I am grateful for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper from the 
members of a workshop on the vices sponsored by the Calvin College Center for 
Christian Scholarship and the Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, con-
vened by Rebecca DeYoung and held at Notre Dame in August, 2007.
